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“Congress . . . intended in the Fair Sentencing Act to repeal and redress the
wrongs of the older crack sentencing statute that Congress believed had proven itself
to be arbitrary, irrational, and racially discriminatory.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The year is 1995. Imagine Andre, who grew up in inner city Cleveland and has
an eighth grade education. Two years before, and shortly after his eighteenth
*

Jeffrey B. Lazarus is an attorney for the Federal Defender’s Office for the Northern
District of Ohio. Mr. Lazarus received his J.D. from Case Western Reserve University Law
School and was admitted to the Ohio bar in 2005. He is also an adjunct professor at Case
Western Reserve University Law School. Many thanks go to the other Federal Defenders who
have been working with Mr. Lazarus on litigating these crack cocaine disparity issues in the
courts, including: Dennis Terez, Melissa Salinas, Amy Cleary, and Christine Sason.
1

United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2013); reh’g en banc granted,
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15872 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013).
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birthday, Andre was arrested two separate times for selling crack cocaine to an
undercover officer. He received probation and went back onto the street. In 1995,
Andre was arrested for possessing sixty grams of crack cocaine, clearly not an
amount for personal use. Due to the amount, the federal prosecutors chose to charge
Andre with a federal drug offense.2 Because he possessed over fifty grams, and
because he had two prior drug offenses, Andre faced a sentence of mandatory life in
prison.3 After a short trial, Andre was convicted and sentenced to life in prison,
despite having no history of violence in his past or in this offense. Today, Andre is
now thirty-nine years old and will die in prison because in the federal system “life”
means life without the possibility of parole.4
Andre is not unique. There are literally thousands of people serving mandatory
life sentences for crack cocaine offenses in federal prison.5 Approximately eightyfive percent of them are African-American.6 For decades, defense lawyers have been
challenging, without any success, the disproportionate federal sentencing laws for
crack cocaine, compared to powder cocaine, as both being irrationally harsh and
having an unfair impact on African-Americans.7
In 2010, Congress passed and the President signed legislation to “restore
fairness” to the federal crack cocaine laws by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act.8
Were Andre sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, he would receive a mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years, as opposed to a mandatory life sentence.9 This
legislation, however, did not explicitly state whether it could apply retroactively to
those already serving these harsh sentences.10 As a result, federal courts have refused
to grant relief to defendants sentenced prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing
Act;11 Two narrow exceptions are detailed herein. Thus, despite legislation that the
2

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1995).

3

Id.

4

See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984)
(Congress abolished parole in federal sentences, meaning that “life” means life without the
possibility of release in the federal system.); Skowronek v. Brennan, 896 F.2d 264 (7th Cir.
1990).
5

Blewett, 719 F.3d at 484.

6

United States v. Doe, 731 F.3d 518, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Kimbrough v. United
States, 552 U.S. 85, 98 (2007)).
7

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 962 F.2d 1218, 1227 (6th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 66 (5th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 753-56 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
8

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).

9

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 2013).

10

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).

11

United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 580 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomes,
621 F.3d 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 (8th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Diaz, 627 F.3d 930, 931 (2d Cir.
2010); United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Baptist,
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old sentencing scheme has been declared to be wrong and unfair, Andre must still
languish in prison under the old penalties for the rest of his life.
Such a result is unjust and unfair. This article advocates for the retroactive
application of the Fair Sentencing Act. Part II of this Article will detail the history of
the federal crack cocaine sentencing laws, from 1986 through the passage of the Fair
Sentencing Act. Part III will detail the recent cases dealing with attempts at
retroactivity in the lower courts. Part IV outlines the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Dorsey,12 which was a ground-breaking step towards the FSA’s
retroactive effect. Part V offers arguments in support of retroactivity. Part VI offers
legal challenges in which inmates can seek relief in the courts. In Part VII, we will
leave the courtroom and offer policy reasons why the retroactivity of the Fair
Sentencing Act does not just benefit those serving crack cocaine sentences, but is a
benefit to the public as a whole.13
II. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING LAWS
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,14 which set forth federal
laws regarding illegal drugs. The statute delineated specific drugs, and set forth
penalties relative to each drug and amounts.15 The statute created “mandatory
minimum” sentences—sentencing floors—which a federal judge cannot go below
unless narrow factual circumstances are present.16 Generally, the statute set drug
quantity thresholds, which invoked no mandatory minimum,17 a five-year mandatory
minimum,18 or a ten-year mandatory minimum.19 The five-year mandatory minimum
could be escalated to ten if the defendant had a prior drug felony.20 The ten-year
mandatory minimum rose to twenty years with a prior drug felony, and mandatory
life with two prior drug felonies.21
646 F.3d 1225, 1226-28 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237, 248-49 (4th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 252-55 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Powell, 652 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2011).
12

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).

13

For the sake of brevity, the Fair Sentencing Act will henceforth be referred to as the

FSA.
14

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).

15

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1) (West 1986).

16

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2010); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5G1.1, 5K1.1 (2004); Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 289-90
(1996).
17

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C)
(West 2010)).
18
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B)
(West 2010)).
19
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)
(West 2010)).
20

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B)
(West 2010)).
21

Id.
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Crack cocaine and powder cocaine were separately dealt with in the Anti-Drug
Abuse statute.22 Some courts have rejected any chemical difference between crack
and powder cocaine, and have concluded the law should not treat the two
differently.23 Cases involving five hundred grams of powder cocaine invoked the
five-year mandatory minimum, whereas possession of only five grams of crack
cocaine triggered the same mandatory penalty.24 Furthermore, a case involving five
thousand grams of powder cocaine triggered the ten-year mandatory minimum, but a
case involving fifty grams of crack cocaine had the same penalty.25 Thus, any
defendant with fifty grams of crack cocaine and two prior drug felonies would be
sentenced to mandatory life in prison.26
The United States Sentencing Commission oversees the enactment and
maintenance of federal sentencing guidelines, which aim to promote “certainty and
fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities.”27 In response
to the Anti-Drug Abuse statute, the Sentencing Commission set offense levels to
reflect the mandatory minimums set forth in the statute.28 The Supreme Court has
held that this was done because the Sentencing Commission wanted to “keep similar
drug-trafficking sentences proportional.”29 Thus, since the passage of the Anti-Drug
Abuse statute, proportionality in sentencing for drug crimes has always been the
paramount concern.
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Congress’s statutory choice to treat crack
cocaine so harshly, as compared to powder cocaine, received significant challenge
and criticism. Allowing a mandatory minimum for crack cocaine quantities that were
one percent the amount to trigger the same penalties for powder cocaine came under
scrutiny. This came to be referred as the “one hundred to one ratio”.30 For example,
consider two defendants, both with a prior drug felony. One defendant has four
hundred and ninety-nine grams of powder cocaine, but will not receive any
mandatory minimum.31 Another defendant has six grams of crack cocaine, and as a
22

21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current versions at 21 U.S.C.A. §
841 (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (West 2010)).
23
See United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633, 641 (N.D. Iowa, 2009) (“Special
Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (April 1997) . . . strongly suggests
that the distinctions between the two controlled substances are artificial, at best. . . . [T]he
prosecution offered no argument or logical reason why crack cocaine and powder cocaine
should be treated differently, on the basis of the controlled substances themselves.”).
24

21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(B) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841
(b)(1)(B) (West 2010)).
25
21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C.A. § 841
(b)(1)(A) (West 2010)).
26

Id.

27

28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2006).

28

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2327 (2012).

29

Id. at 2328; Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97 (2007).

30

See, e.g., Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97; United States v. Doe, 2013 WL 4792135, at *1
(6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013).
31
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C)
(West 2010)).
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result will be subject to a mandatory minimum of ten years.32 Such a penalty
structure did not achieve the Sentencing Commission’s goal of uniformity and
proportionality in federal sentencing.33 Furthermore, there was significant racial
disparity as a result of these disproportionate penalties.
As a result of these crack cocaine mandatory minimum penalties, thousands of
defendants (an overwhelming majority of which are African-American) were
convicted for crack offenses and are currently serving mandatory sentences of
twenty years or life.34 The racially discriminatory impact of the crack cocaine
sentencing scheme showed that nearly one hundred percent of all crack defendants
were non-white.35 In fact, from 1988 to 1995, federal prosecutors prosecuted no
whites under the crack provisions in seventeen states, including major cities such as:
Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles.36 In 2010, the Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, called this disparity in
sentencing “one of the most notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the
modern criminal justice system.”37
Given this unwarranted disparity, defense attorneys challenged the sentencing
disparities between the powder and crack cocaine penalties throughout the 1990s and
2000s.38 Twenty-one years after the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse statute, the
Sentencing Commission passed retroactive guideline amendments.39 These
retroactive amendments allowed defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses to
receive a two-level reduction in their base offense levels.40 While these amendments

32
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A)
(West 2010)).
33

Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328 (citing Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 97-98; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N,
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 53-54 (Oct. 2011)).
34
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE PATTY SARIS TO THE UNITED STATES
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE: REEVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCES 3 (Sept. 18, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF
JUDGE
SARIS],
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Submissions/20130918_SJC_Mandatory_Minimums.
pdf.
35
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.34
(2011) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK] (94% non-white); LaJuana
Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack
Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 386-88 & n.68 (2011).
36

Dan Weikel, War on Crack Targets Minorities Over Whites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995,
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-05-21/news/mn-4468_1_crack-cocaine ; United States v.
Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013).
37

156 CONG. REC. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010).

38

See supra text accompanying note 7.

39

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 706 (effective Nov. 1, 2007).

40

Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013

5

718

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:713

allowed defendants to receive reductions from their sentencing guideline ranges, all
mandatory minimums sentences were unaffected and remained in place.41
On August 3, 2010, Congress passed, and the President signed, the Fair
Sentencing Act.42 The FSA increased the threshold amounts of crack cocaine which
trigger the respective mandatory minimums.43 To invoke the five-year mandatory
minimum, a defendant must possess twenty-eight grams, raised from five grams.44
For the ten-year mandatory minimum, a defendant must possess two hundred and
eighty grams, raised from fifty grams.45 The FSA also directed the Sentencing
Commission to pass amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the
statutory changes.46 Soon thereafter, the Sentencing Commission passed additional
retroactive guideline amendments, lowering base offense levels.47
When the Sentencing Commission passes retroactive guideline amendments,
those whose sentences are affected by the amendment may seek a sentence
reduction.48 Title 18 United States Code § 3582(c)(2) does not provide for a full
resentencing but allows the defendants sentenced to be reduced, substituting only the
retroactive guideline amendment.49 At the time Amendment 750 went into effect,
there were nearly thirty thousand federal inmates serving sentences for crack cocaine
offenses, approximately fifteen percent of the entire federal prison population.50
Most of these thirty thousand inmates believed the passage of Amendment 750
would provide them with some relief.51 Unfortunately, only those defendants who
were sentenced above their respective mandatory minimums were able to get any
reduction.52
III. ALL DEFENDANTS SERVING SENTENCES UNDER THE PRE-FSA MANDATORY
MINIMUMS ARE DENIED RELIEF
Remember Andre; serving mandatory life for possessing sixty grams of crack? If
he were arrested in September of 2010 for the same offense, the FSA would have
41

United States v. Hameed, 614 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Johnson, 564
F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2009).
42

Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).

47

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).

48

18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2002).

49

Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2690 (2010); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 1B1.10(b) (2004).
50

United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2013).

51

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 9.

52

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY CRACK RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT tbl.9 (July
2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY DATA], available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/FSA_Amendmen
t/2013-07_USSC_Prelim_Crack_Retro_Data_Report_FSA.pdf.
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subjected him to a five-year mandatory minimum, and a ten-year mandatory
minimum because of his prior drug felony.53 Thus, if the FSA is made retroactive,
Andre would receive a mandatory ten years, not the mandatory life sentence he is
currently serving.
Unsurprisingly, after the passage of the FSA, numerous defendants who
languished in prison under the, now deleted, pre-FSA statutory penalties sought
relief.54 Waves of motions were filed challenging the validity of their sentences,
arguing their pre-FSA mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional or
improper.55 Each and every circuit court denied relief.56 All eleven circuit courts
relied on the “general savings statute,”57 1 U.S.C. § 109, which states:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated
as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action
or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
All circuits concluded that because the FSA does not contain any express
statement of retroactivity, and without any express statement from Congress, the
court refused to allow any retroactive effect.58 Thus, despite these drastic changes to
the crack cocaine statutory penalties, defendants were unable to pierce their pre-FSA
statutory mandatory minimums. In fact, a thorough review of the relevant cases has
only revealed one case where the defendant was able to receive a sentence reduction
below the pre-FSA mandatory minimums. In United States v. Miller,59 the defendant
was twenty-seven years old when convicted in 1989 of a drug trafficking
conspiracy60 and firearm offenses.61 He was found to be a career offender, which
placed his sentencing guideline range at three hundred and sixty months to life;
however, because of his multiple prior felony drug convictions, he was
statutorily-mandated to receive a life sentence.62 The district court sentenced Miller
to a life sentence, with a five-year consecutive sentence for the firearm offenses.63
Three days after the passage of the FSA, the district court granted Miller a
sentence reduction to two hundred and sixty-two months, allowing him to be
immediately released. The district court recognized that Miller’s career offender
53

21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(B) (West 2010).

54

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRELIMINARY DATA, supra note 52, at tbl.1.

55

Id.

56

See supra text accompanying note 11.

57

Because the case law also refers to the general savings statute as the general savings
clause, the two terms will be used interchangeably.
58

See supra text accompanying note 11.

59

United States v. Miller, No. 4:89-CR-120, 2010 WL 3119768 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2010).

60

21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (West 2010).

61

Miller, 2010 WL 3119768, at *1.

62

Id.; 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 2010).

63

Miller, 2010 WL 3119768, at *1.
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status and statutorily mandated life sentence under the pre-FSA penalties prevented
him from receiving a sentencing reduction.64 However the district court granted
Miller a sentencing reduction anyway, recognizing, “[t]his case, however, represents
a singular and unique exception.”65
In support of its order, the district court referenced the FSA, by stating, “[at] the
original sentence, [the Court] did not consider the crack/powder disparity—a
disparity that Congress and the sentencing commission have repeatedly attempted to
resolve.”66 The court noted that under the 2010 statutes and guidelines, Miller would
not have received a life sentence, but would have been sentenced in the range of two
hundred and ten to two hundred and sixty-two months.67 The district court also stated
that Miller had served more than twenty years already, and that “[s]uch a sentence
absolutely and adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense and provides just
punishment. In addition, nothing in the record suggests defendant represents a
danger to the community if released.”68 Thus, while the district court never used the
term “retroactive,” the district court did in fact retroactively apply the FSA to
Miller’s 1989 sentence. The government did not appeal Miller’s sentence
reduction.69
With all due respect to the Miller Court, while the district court hinged its
decision on Miller being “a singular and unique exception,”70 there is nothing unique
or singular about his case. There are thousands of defendants serving sentences just
like Miller’s throughout the country.71 His receipt of a sentence reduction due to the
retroactive application of the FSA stands alone. In the wake of the passage of the
FSA, no other defendants have incurred the same benefit as Miller—the retroactive
application of the FSA. Countless numbers of defendants were denied any relief and
remain incarcerated, serving sentences based solely on the pre-FSA statutory
penalties.72
Just as the dust began to settle, and all circuit courts had ruled the FSA was not
retroactive, a factual anomaly presented itself. The issue arose: What about
defendants who pled guilty or were convicted prior to the passage of the FSA, but
whose sentencing hearing occurred after the FSA went into effect? The defendants in
these cases have been called “pipeline” or “straddle” cases.73 A circuit split arose on
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at *2.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. at *1.

71

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 9-10.

72

Id. at 10 (If the FSA were retroactive, 8,829 inmates would be eligible for a reduction,
with an average reduction of 53 months per inmate. Also, 87.7% of those are eligible are
African-American.).
73

United States v. McNair, No. 10-5901, 2012 WL 987753 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2012);
United States v. Gillam, 753 F. Supp. 2d 683 (W.D. Mich. 2010).
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how to handle these pipeline cases. The First Circuit in United States v. Douglas,74
found the FSA could apply to these pipeline defendants. The First Circuit expressed
its awareness of the general savings statute, and the presumption against
retroactivity, but found, “the savings statute [1 U.S.C. § 109] may be overridden
‘either by express declaration or necessary implication.’”75 The First Circuit ordered
retroactive application of the FSA because it was a “fair result.”76 Thus, the First
Circuit found the FSA could be retroactively applied to pipeline defendants because
such a result was only fair, thereby overcoming the presumption against
retroactivity.
The Third Circuit issued a similar holding in United States v. Dixon.77 The Third
Circuit also found the FSA to apply to pipeline defendants as, “[t]he language of the
Act reveals Congress’s intent that courts no longer be forced to impose mandatory
minimums sentences that are both indefensible and discriminatory.”78 The Dixon
Court refused to follow the presumption against retroactivity, finding, “the Saving
Statute cannot control when preserving repealed penalties would plainly conflict
with the intent of Congress as expressed in a subsequent statute.”79 The Court was
also guided by the overarching principle of fairness, stating their holding, “comports
with its stated purpose to restore fairness to federal cocaine sentencing.”80
The Eleventh Circuit also allowed retroactive application of the FSA to pipeline
defendants in United States v. Rojas,81 but the Court en banc later vacated the
holding.82
The Seventh Circuit went against Douglas and Dixon, holding the FSA could not
be retroactively applied to pipeline defendants.83 The Court began its opinion stating
the FSA should be more aptly named “The Not Quite as Fair as it could be
Sentencing Act of 2010.”84 The Court, however, refused to “read in by implication
anything not obvious in the text of the FSA. We believe that if Congress wanted the
FSA or the guideline amendments to apply to not-yet-sentenced defendants
convicted on pre-FSA conduct, it would have at least dropped a hint to that effect
somewhere in the text of the FSA.”85 Thus, relying solely on the text of the FSA, the
Court denied any retroactive effect to pipeline defendants.

74

United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011).

75

Id. at 43 (quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908)).

76

Id. at 44 (citing United States v. Goncalves, 642 F.3d 245, 244-45 (1st Cir. 2011)).

77

United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011).

78

Id. at 196.

79

Id. at 199.

80

Id. at 203.

81

United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2011).

82

United States v. Hudson, 659 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2011).

83

United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011).

84

Id. at 338.

85

Id. at 339-40.
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Given this split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certorari
in United States v. Dorsey,86 to determine whether the FSA could be retroactively
applied to pipeline defendants.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT GRANTS RETROACTIVE RELIEF TO PIPELINE DEFENDANTS
In Dorsey, the Supreme Court held the mandatory minimums statutory penalties
in the FSA apply to defendants sentenced after the FSA’s enactment, regardless of
when they committed the offense.87 The Court set forth six considerations, which all
taken together, supported its holding.88
First, the Court held the saving statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, does not require an
“express statement” for a criminal statute to apply retroactively, as long as the “plain
import” or “fair implication” of the statute so provides.89 The Court acknowledged
the savings statute purported to require that subsequent Congresses expressly state
whether ameliorative criminal statutes would apply to offenses that occurred prior to
the enactment of the statute, but noted that “statutes enacted by one Congress cannot
bind a later Congress.”90 Thus, the Court held the saving statute is not a bar to
applicability, as long as courts “assure themselves that ordinary interpretive
considerations point clearly in that direction.”91
Second, the Court observed that the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) sets forth a
different background sentencing principle that defendants generally do get the
benefit of ameliorative sentencing amendments.92 It noted that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), courts must apply the Guidelines that are in effect on the date of
the initial sentencing.93 Thus, “when the Commission adopts new, lower Guideline
amendments, those amendments become effective to offenders who committed an
offense prior to the adoption of the new amendments but are sentenced
thereafter.”94The Court “assume[d] that Congress was aware of this different
background sentencing principle,” and interpreted the FSA to be consistent with
such principles.95
Third, the Court explained the language in the FSA implies that Congress
intended to follow the SRA’s background principle allowing for defendants to
benefit from ameliorative sentencing amendments.96 In the FSA, Congress required
the Sentencing Commission to promulgate “as soon as practicable” (not later than
86

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).

87

Id. at 2335.

88

Id. at 2331.

89

Id. at 2332.

90

Id. at 2331.

91

Id. at 2332.

92

Id. at 2331.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 2332.
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ninety days after August 3, 2010), sentencing guidelines amendments in order to
“achieve consistency with other guideline provisions and applicable law.”97
Fourth, the Court observed that by denying relief to defendants like Dorsey,
thereby applying the pre-FSA mandatory minimums to post-FSA sentencings, this
result would create “disparities of a kind that Congress enacted the [SRA] and the
[FSA] to prevent.”98 Two individuals who were sentenced at the same time, at the
same place, and even by the same judge would receive substantially different
sentences based only on the date of their conduct.99 In addition, applying pre-FSA
mandatory minimums at post-FSA sentencings would require courts to impose
pre-Act sentences after “Congress had specifically found such a sentence was
unfairly long.”100
Fifth, if the FSA were not applied, instead of restoring fairness to federal cocaine
sentencing, the result would make sentences even more disproportionate.101 “It
would create new anomalies—new sets of disproportionate sentences—not
previously present. This is because sentencing courts would be required to apply the
[post-FSA] sentencing guidelines in conjunction with the [pre-FSA] mandatory
minimums . . . This would result in a sentencing ‘cliff’ wherever a defendant was
subject to a [pre-FSA] mandatory minimum.”102 Such a sentencing scheme would
also result in sentencing valleys where defendants with substantially different
conduct would be subject to the same sentence.103
Sixth, the Court explained there were no strong countervailing considerations
against its holding.104 Taking these six considerations together, the Court concluded
that Congress intended the FSA’s more lenient mandatory minimums to apply to
post-FSA sentencing of pre-FSA offenders.105
In total, the Dorsey Court found the savings statute did not bar relief to pipeline
defendants because the FSA’s “language, structure, and basic objectives,” including
the “plain import” or “fair implication” intended the new mandatory minimums to
apply.106 The Court rested its conclusion “primarily upon the fact that a contrary
determination would seriously undermine basic Federal Sentencing Guidelines
objectives such as uniformity and proportionality in sentencing. . . . [A] contrary
determination would (in respect to relevant groups of drug offenders) produce
sentences less uniform and more disproportionate than if Congress had not enacted

97
Id. (quoting Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8(2), 124 Stat. 2372,
2374 (2010)).
98

Id. at 2333.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 2334.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 2337-38.

104

Id. at 2335.

105

Id.

106

Id.
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the Fair Sentencing Act at all.”107 The Court also recognized that application of the
new mandatory minimums to pre-FSA offenders sentenced after the FSA’s effective
date would create a new set of disparities, which would contravene the goals of
federal sentencing.108
V. DORSEY BROKE NEW GROUND THEREBY ALLOWING DEFENDANTS TO RECEIVE
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE FSA
The Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey made clear that defendants whose
offense pre-dated the FSA, but had not yet been sentenced, could receive retroactive
application of the FSA. Consistent with the Court’s holding in Dorsey, all defendants
sentenced before August 3, 2010, should also receive the application of the FSA’s
new mandatory minimum statutory penalties. The Court’s rationale in Dorsey and
the Court’s six considerations, apply with equal force to defendants sentenced prior
to the passage of the FSA. Applying these same six considerations (for the sake of
brevity, they have been condensed to five) from Dorsey to those sentenced prior to
the FSA, requires retroactive application of the FSA.
First, Dorsey makes clear there is no “express statement” of retroactivity found in
the FSA.109 This does not prevent retroactivity, but instead allowed the Dorsey Court
to look at the “plain import” and “fair implication” of the FSA.110 In doing so, the
Supreme Court concluded that by enacting the FSA, “Congress intended the [Act’s]
new, lower mandatory minimums to apply to the post-Act sentencing of pre-Act
offenders.”111 Thus, even though the legislation made no mention of retroactivity,
either for or against it, the Court was able to infer retroactivity to pipeline defendants
by looking at the FSA’s fair implication. In doing so, the Court relied on FSA’s
express purpose, which was to “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.”112
Because there cannot be limited, or partial, retroactivity of a statute,113 if pipeline
defendants can receive retroactive application of the FSA, then those sentenced prior
to the FSA’s passage must receive retroactive application as well. If courts are to be
true to the Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey, then the “plain import” and “fair
implication” of the FSA is application to all defendants who are serving sentences
for crack cocaine offenses. This is the only plausible and rational way to follow
Congress’s will—to restore fairness in crack cocaine sentencing.
Second, the Dorsey Court found that a “background principle” of federal
sentencing supported retroactive application of the FSA.114 In Dorsey, the Court was
not faced with sentence reduction motions,115 collateral attacks or post-conviction
107

Id. at 2326.

108

Id. at 2335.

109

Id. at 2331.

110

Id. at 2335.

111

Id.

112

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).

113

United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 446 (7th Cir. 2011).

114

Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2332.

115

18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2002).
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challenges116 to a defendant’s sentence, but the issue was under which statutory
penalties pipeline defendants should be subject to at their initial sentencing.117 The
provision considered in Dorsey—18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii)—provides for
retroactive application of the sentencing Guidelines not expressly, but through a
general command the sentencing court apply the Guidelines “in effect at the time of
sentencing.”118 In some cases, this principle leads to the retroactive application of the
Guidelines to conduct that pre-dated the new law.119 In post-sentencing proceedings,
most specifically sentence reduction motions, however, there is a different statute at
issue—18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) —which in contrast to § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii), expressly
provides retroactive sentencing amendments. Thus, the retroactive application of the
FSA is not merely a “background principle” in these statutory provisions as it was in
Dorsey, but is plainly in the foreground.
Third, Dorsey relied heavily on the need for consistency between the sentencing
guidelines and the FSA, and such need supports retroactivity. The Court stated the
FSA expressly directed there be “consistency” between the guidelines and
“applicable law,” including the FSA’s statutory amendments.120 This directive was
so important that Congress granted “emergency authority” to the Sentencing
Commission and directed them to enact retroactive sentencing guidelines
amendments reflecting the statutory changes in the FSA.121 The “fair implication” of
this command for consistency is that Congress wanted the new sentencing guidelines
to comport with the new statute and vice versa. This consideration was also detailed
by the First Circuit in Douglas, in which the Court stated, “[i]t seems unrealistic to
suppose that Congress strongly desired to put the [new] guidelines in effect by
November 1 even for crimes committed before the FSA but balked at giving the
same defendants the benefit of the newly enacted eighteen to one mandatory
minimums.”122 It is irrational to assume that Congress gave the Sentencing
Commission discretion to make the new sentencing guidelines retroactive, but did
not want the same for the FSA’s mandatory minimums, with which the new
sentencing guidelines were to be consistent. Congress’s strong desire for
consistency, and its directive to the Sentencing Commission, fairly implies that the
statute was to go wherever the guidelines went.
Fourth, as in Dorsey, continuing to apply the pre-FSA mandatory minimums to
sentence reduction motions, and denying retroactivity would create the same kind of
disparity Congress enacted the SRA and the FSA to prevent. Both the SRA and the
FSA were enacted to prevent disparities in sentencing; in fact, the FSA’s express
purpose was to restore fairness.123 Denying retroactivity of the FSA would not only
116

Such as a habeas corpus motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).

117

Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330.

118

Id. at 2332.

119

Id.

120

Id. (quoting Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8(2), 124 Stat. 2372,
2374 (2010)).
121

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374 (2010).

122

United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2011).

123

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(6) (West 2010); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)).
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fail to achieve consistency, but would create greater inconsistency in federal
sentencing. Consider this hypothetical: Bruce is arrested on July 1, 2010, he
immediately pleads guilty and is sentenced on August 1, 2010. Because Bruce had
fifty-five grams of crack cocaine, he is subject to the mandatory minimum of ten
years, and because he had two prior drug felonies, Bruce is sentenced to mandatory
life in prison.124 Now, consider Lou, who is arrested on the same day, with the same
amount of crack, and also has two prior drug felonies. Lou initially wanted to go to
trial, and delayed resolution of his case for six weeks. Then, on August 15, 2010,
Lou pleads guilty and is sentenced. Because his conviction and sentencing occurred
after the FSA, however, he will only be subject to the five-year mandatory
minimum, and with his prior convictions, Lou will be subject to the ten-year
mandatory minimum.125 Thus, two identical defendants could receive extremely
disparate sentences. This disparity between the sentences of Bruce and Lou is
precisely the sort of disparity that Congress enacted the FSA to prevent; the
elimination of such a disparity was central to the rationale underlying Dorsey.
A similar point was detailed by Chief Judge Easterbrook in his decision to deny
rehearing en banc in United States v. Holcomb.126 Chief Judge Easterbrook noted
that Attorney General Holder issued a Memorandum to all federal prosecutors on
July 15, 2011, which directed them to take the position that the FSA applied to all
cases in which a sentence was imposed on or after August 3, 2010.127 As Chief Judge
Easterbrook explained, “the Attorney General has concluded that the 2010 Act is
partially retroactive.”128 He further explained that “the Supreme Court has never held
any change in a criminal penalty to be partially retroactive.129 The choice has always
been binary: retroactive or prospective.”130 “If the FSA is retroactive, then it applies
to all pending cases no matter how far they have got in the judicial system; if it is not
retroactive, then it applies only to crimes committed on or after August 3, 2010.
Nothing depends on the sentencing date, which reflects how long it took to catch a
criminal, and the state of the district judge’s calendar, rather than principles of
deterrence or desert.”131 Chief Judge Easterbrook observed that selecting an effective
date for new legislation can be arbitrary and, he explained the unfairness of partial
retroactivity as follows:
[W]hat’s fair about condemning someone sentenced on August 2 to more
time in prison than a person sentenced the next day, even though they
committed their crimes on the same date (and may have been
coconspirators)? Suppose comrades in crime distribute cocaine in mid2009 and are caught promptly. One confesses, pleads guilty, and testifies
124

21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(A)(viii) (West 2010).

125

21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (b)(1)(B)(viii) (West 2010).

126

United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2011).

127

Id. at 445.

128

Id.

129

Id. at 446.

130

Id.

131

Id. at 446-47.
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at the trial of the other, who fights tooth and nail and falsely denies
culpability. The first is sentenced on August 1, 2010, the second on
September 1. How would it be “fair” (or even conscionable) to give the
lower sentence to the person who refused to accept responsibility for his
crimes, just because by dragging out the process that person was
sentenced after August 2?132
Fifth, the Court in Dorsey, found no sufficiently strong countervailing
considerations to deny retroactive relief to the pipeline defendants.133 Similarly, there
are no such considerations here. An argument against retroactivity would be
preserving the finality of judgments. Courts are reluctant to re-open cases which
have been finalized for years.134 The law, however, provides defendants with a
statutory remedy to reduce their sentences, if, and only if, their sentencing guidelines
have changed.135 This narrow, but defined remedy, is available to defendants, and
has been provided by Congress. Thus Congress, in passing § 3582(c)(2), has held
that preserving the finality of judgments should not be the overriding concern. In
fact, the Supreme Court has noted that sentence reduction motions, § 3582(c)(2),
“represent[] a congressional act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit of
later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.”136
Thus, all the reasons the Supreme Court relied upon in Dorsey, and allowing
retroactive application of the FSA to pipeline defendants, also equally apply to those
currently serving sentences under the pre-FSA crack cocaine mandatory minimums.
There is one additional principle of statutory construction in support of
retroactivity, which was not addressed by the Dorsey Court. Before passing the FSA,
Congress was faced with a prior version of the FSA, which included a clause
expressly providing that “[t]here shall be no retroactive application of any portion of
this Act.”137 The final version of the bill, which actually passed, did not include said
provision. Because this provision against retroactivity was not included in the final
version of the bill, it may be presumed that Congress did not intend to preclude
retroactivity of the FSA. “Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier
version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the
limitation was not intended.”138 The deletion of limiting language is exactly what
132

Id. at 451-52.

133

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2335 (2012).

134

Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010).

135

18 U.S.C.A. § 3582 (c)(2) (West 2002).

136

Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2692.

137

H.R. 265, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009).

138

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-24 (1983)); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris
Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1993) (quoting Russello, applying it to rejection of
Senate draft of bill, and stating “[w]e are directed by those words [in the final bill], and not by
the discarded draft”); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
442-43 (1987) (noting enactment of House bill rather than Senate bill and stating that “[f]ew
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress
does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of
other language”).
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happened here; the earlier version of the bill expressly and broadly barred any
retroactive application and the final version of the bill contained no limitation at all.
Just as was seen before Dorsey, the major hurdle to full retroactivity is the
savings statute. While the Dorsey Court felt the saving statute did not alter their
holding,139 the clause has nonetheless been the critical factor in lower courts denying
retroactivity, even post-Dorsey.140 Thus, any defendant seeking retroactivity must
still convince the court the general savings statute does not apply.
The general savings statute was enacted in 1871 in order to “abolish the
common-law presumption that the repeal of a criminal statute resulted in the
abatement of ‘all prosecutions which had not reached final disposition in the highest
court authorized to review them.’”141 Such abatements were “often the product of
legislative inadvertence.”142 The saving statute cannot be viewed narrowly, but its
context must be considered in light of the statutes at issue. As the Supreme Court
held in Hertz v. Woodman,143 the saving statute is “to be read and construed as a part
of all subsequent repealing statutes, in order to give effect to the will and intent of
Congress.”144
In Bradley v. United States,145 the Supreme Court considered whether defendants
convicted of drug offenses committed prior to the effective date of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 could benefit from
that Act, or whether they were required to be sentenced according to the law in force
at the time of the offenses even though their sentences were imposed after it.
Following the savings statute, the Supreme Court noted that “[a]t common law, the
repeal of a criminal statute abated all prosecutions that had not reached final
disposition in the highest court authorized to review them.”146 The rule applied even
when the statute was not repealed, but the penalty reduced.147 “To avoid such results,
legislatures frequently indicated an intention not to abate pending prosecutions by
including in the repealing statute a specific clause stating that prosecutions of
offenses under the repealed statute were not to be abated.”148 In Bradley, the Court
considered such a saving clause that was included in the statute at issue and it held
139

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2331 (2012).

140

United States v. Hippolyte, 712 F.3d 535, 542 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Finley,
487 F. App’x. 260, 264-65 (6th Cir. 2012).
141

Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 660 (1974) (quoting Bradley
v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 606-07 (1973)).
142

Marrero, 417 U.S. at 660; Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1964).

143

Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 217 (1910).

144

See also United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Saving Statute
cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested, either expressly or by
necessary implication, in a subsequent enactment.”); United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39,
43 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he savings statute may be overridden either by express declaration or
necessary implication.”).
145

Bradley, 410 U.S. at 606.
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Id. at 607.
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Id. at 608.
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Id.
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that “prosecution” in that context meant “prosecution” as it was understood in its
legal sense.149 Thus, the district court in Bradley properly rejected the defendant’s
argument that the statute’s ameliorative provisions should have been applied to them
because they were sentenced after it went into effect.150
Bradley’s reliance on the savings clause should not control in determining the
retroactivity of the FSA. Retroactively applying the FSA, either through a sentence
reduction motion or a collateral attack, does not concern a pending prosecution and
thus unlike Bradley, the general saving statute does not apply. Indeed, since a §
3582(c)(2) sentence reduction motion has a “limited scope and purpose,”151 it “does
not authorize a resentencing,” and is “within the narrow bounds established by the
[Sentencing] Commission.”152 Moreover, unlike the statute at issue in Bradley, the
FSA does not contain a specific saving clause, and in fact the FSA does not
expressly address retroactivity at all.
In looking at the congressional intent to determine the retroactivity of the FSA, a
broader interpretation of the savings statute is necessary.153 Such a broader view of
the savings statute is essential because “the Saving Statute cannot control when
preserving repealed penalties would plainly conflict with the intent of Congress as
expressed in a subsequent statute.”154 Even with statutory language that is “clearly
delineated,” exceptions may be implied “where essential to prevent ‘absurd results’
or consequences obviously at a variance with the policy of the enactment as a
whole.”155 Accordingly, the savings clause should not to be applied in circumstances
that lead to an absurd result.
To prevent defendants sentenced under the now-repealed mandatory minimum
sentencing penalties to attain retroactive relief of the FSA would yield absurd results.
To require defendants to continue to languish under discriminatory and unfair
sentencing provisions, would seriously undermine Congress’s intent in passing the
FSA. Congress could not have been clearer in their purpose for passing the FSA,
which was to “restore fairness in federal cocaine sentencing.”156 Congress’s
secondary purpose was to achieve consistency.157 Neither fairness nor consistency
can be achieved if countless defendants remain incarcerated under the pre-FSA
statutory mandatory minimums. To effectuate the FSA’s objectives, the statute’s
retroactivity cannot stop with pipeline defendants, but must apply to all defendants
who are incarcerated for crack offenses.
149

Id. at 609.

150

Id. at 609-10.

151

Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2692 (2010).
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Id. at 2694.
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Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
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United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 199 (3d Cir. 2011).
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United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979); see also Bailey v. Lawrence,
972 F.2d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1992); Sosa v. Jones, 389 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that it is “a traditional and appropriate function of the courts” to “construe
statutes so as to avoid absurd results”).
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Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, pmbl., 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010)).
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Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372, 2374 (2010);
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2012).
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Additionally, viewing the totality of events that led up to the FSA is an important
consideration in determining retroactivity. With the goal of “restoring fairness,” the
FSA is remedial in nature and is clearly intended to provide relief from what is now
recognized as an unduly harsh and unjustified punishment. Principles of statutory
construction support the retroactivity of the FSA because remedial legislation should
be construed liberally.158 While the FSA deals with penalty provisions, which are not
traditionally viewed as remedial legislation, the FSA was unquestionably intended to
remedy what has come to be viewed as unfair and unduly harsh sentencing.
Thus, principles of statutory construction, a fair reading of the FSA, and applying
the rationale of the Supreme Court’s holding in Dorsey all point to the complete
retroactivity of the FSA. Defendants who are currently serving sentences under the
pre-FSA mandatory minimums should seek a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) as well as challenge the constitutionality of their sentence by a collateral
attack, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
VI. HOW THOSE WHO CONTINUE TO LANGUISH IN PRISON UNDER THE PRE-FSA
PENALTIES SEEK RETROACTIVE RELIEF
This Author suggests there are two viable ways in which a defendant could
challenge the constitutionality of their sentence: (1) that failure to retroactively apply
the FSA violates the Equal Protection Clause and (2) failure to retroactively apply
the FSA constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Each will be dealt with
individually.
A. Equal Protection of the Laws Requires Retroactive Application of the FSA
Since Dorsey has been issued, only one court has granted relief to inmates
seeking retroactive application of the FSA. On May 17, 2013, the Sixth Circuit
issued United States v. Blewett.159 In Blewett, the two defendants appealed the denial
of their sentence reduction motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).160 The Sixth
Circuit reversed and remanded, finding “the federal judicial perpetuation of the
racially discriminatory mandatory minimum crack sentences for those defendants
sentenced under the old crack sentencing law, as the government advocates, would
violate the Equal Protection Clause, as incorporated into the Fifth Amendment by
the doctrine of Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).”161 The Sixth Circuit also
held the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dorsey confirmed that “Congress . . . intended
the Fair Sentencing Act to repeal and redress the wrongs of the older crack statute
that Congress believed had proven itself to be arbitrary, irrational, and racially
discriminatory. The status quo has now been overturned.”162
The Court went on to say:
158

See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263 n.16 (“[R]emedial statutes are to be liberally construed
and if a retroactive interpretation will promote the ends of justice, they should receive such
construction.”); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 561 n.1 (1999); Clark v. Capital Credit &
Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010); Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 781 (6th
Cir. 1996).
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United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013).

160

Id. at 485.

161

Id. at 484.
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Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
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The remedy is straightforward and relatively simple. The Fair Sentencing
Act and the new retroactive Sentencing Guidelines subsequently adopted
by the Sentencing Commission can and should be interpreted to replace
retroactively the old, discriminatory mandatory minimums with the new,
more lenient minimums. It is our duty under the constitutional-doubt
canon of statutory construction. The Equal Protection Clause requires us
to alter what Senator Leahy called >one of the most notorious symbols of
racial discrimination in the modern criminal justice system= and an
>imbalance that . . . disparages the Constitution’s promise of equal
treatment for all Americans.= In light of our new knowledge about the
racial discrimination inherent in the old law, inertia and judicial instinct to
avoid change and maintain the status quo should no longer protect the old
sentences.163
The Blewett Court recognized it faced a dire situation: “thousands of inmates,
most black, languish in prison under the old, discredited [crack vs. powder] ratio.”164
In examining the Fair Sentencing Act, the Court “regard[ed] as the most important
consideration the clear congressional purpose to end the long, racially discriminatory
sentences imposed in crack cocaine cases over the past twenty-five years.”165 The
Court stated:
In light of our new knowledge about the racial discrimination inherent in
the old law, inertia and judicial instinct to avoid change and maintain the
status quo should no longer protect the old sentences. We should not
allow the government’s legalisms to undermine the purpose of the Fair
Sentencing Act and its more lenient punishment system for crack
cocaine.166
In summary, the Court held, “The [Fair Sentencing Act of 2010] should apply to
all defendants, including those sentenced prior to its passage. We therefore reverse
the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing.”167
Less than two months after the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Blewett, the Court
granted en banc review.168 The effect of granting en banc review vacates the panel’s
opinion in Blewett.169 The case was argued before the entire Sixth Circuit en banc on
October 9th. Despite the uncertainty of Blewett’s future in the Sixth Circuit, as well
as potentially the Supreme Court, the analysis of the Blewett panel regarding Equal
Protection is sound and should be followed.

163

Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 484.

165

Id. at 486.

166

Id. at 490.

167

Id. at 484.

168

Blewett, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15872 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013).

169

See 6TH CIR. R. 35(b) (“A decision to grant rehearing en banc vacates the previous
opinion and judgment of the court, stays the mandate, and restores the case on the docket as a
pending appeal.”).
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The discriminatory impact of the racially-biased crack cocaine sentencing
scheme, by itself, is not an Equal Protection violation. However, the passage of the
FSA, coupled with the congressional intent for passage of the FSA, illustrates that
maintaining the pre-FSA sentences for those incarcerated amounts to an Equal
Protection violation. Thus, failing to retroactively apply the FSA violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
The federal crack cocaine sentences have been extremely disproportionately
applied to African-Americans. [Insert footnore “supra notes 35-37”] Courts,
however, have rejected Equal Protection challenges, even when confronted with
daunting and harsh statistics detailing that African-Americans are prosecuted for
crack over ten times as often as whites.170 While statistics demonstrating the
discriminatory impact alone are unable to provide constitutional relief for those
serving pre-FSA penalties, the passage of the FSA is an intervening event, which has
a dramatic effect on the Equal Protection analysis. The statements from
Congressional members who supported and passed the FSA is substantial evidence
of the discriminatory impact as well as the irrationality of the pre-FSA penalties.
Looking at the totality of the statistics of disparate impact and the words from the
legislature, maintaining these discriminatory pre-FSA sentences constitutes an Equal
Protection violation.
The Supreme Court has held that a statute, which is race-neutral on its face, but is
applied in a way that it invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, may amount to
an Equal Protection violation.171 In fact, the racial impact of a law, rather than a
discriminatory purpose, is a critical factor.172 “Statistics showing racial or ethnic
imbalance are probative . . . [because and] only because such imbalance is often a
telltale sign of purposeful discrimination.”173 The Eighth Circuit has held,
“Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the challenged
conduct bears more heavily upon one race than another.”174 The circuits have held
that when the “natural, probable, and foreseeable result” of a state action is racially
motivated, a presumption of discriminatory intent can occur.175
170
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dumas, 64 F.3d 1427, 1429
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1992).
171
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)).
172

Washington, 426 U.S. at 243 (citing Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451
(1972)); see also id. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Frequently the most probative evidence
of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing
the subjective state of mind of the actor.”).
173

Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977); see also Black
Shield Police Ass’n v. Cleveland, No. C85-1954, 1986 WL 532 at *6 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5,
1986) (“An inference of discriminatory purpose may arise from the historical background or
from statistics showing the disparate impact.”).
174

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 567 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir.
1977) (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242).
175
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Ed., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 433
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Thus, the statistics are probative, but not the sole touchstone, in determining
whether the disproportionate application of the crack laws constitutes an Equal
Protection violation.176 Regarding these statistics, the Sentencing Commission
reported that in 2011, eighty-three percent of federal crack cocaine defendants were
African-American.177 Additionally, from 1988 to 1995, federal prosecutors
prosecuted no whites under the crack provisions in seventeen states, including major
cities such as: Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles.178 Thus,
the pre-FSA sentencing statute has been disparately applied and has resulted in a
significantly high proportion of African-Americans being sentenced. The Second
Circuit even noted in 2011 the “retroactive [Guidelines] amendments exist to allow
inequities to be fixed and the now-infamous 100-to-1 ratio was the source of
shameful inequalities.”179
To buttress these statistics, members of Congress who supported the passage of
the FSA have recognized the discriminatory impact of the pre-FSA sentencing
scheme. On October 15, 2009, Senator Dick Durbin stated: “It is important to note
that the crack/powder disparity disproportionately affects African Americans. . .
There is widespread and growing agreement that the Federal cocaine and sentencing
policy in the United States today is unjustified and unjust.”180 Senator Leahy stated,
“These disproportionate punishments have had a disparate impact on minority
communities. This is unjust and runs contrary to our fundamental principles of equal
justice under law . . . The racial imbalance that has resulted from the cocaine
sentencing disparity disparages the Constitution’s promise of equal treatment for all
Americans.”181 Representative Lee stated, “This disparity made no sense when it was
initially enacted, and makes absolutely no sense today. . . . The unwarranted
sentencing disparity not only overstates the relative harmfulness of the two forms of
the drug and diverts federal resources from high-level drug traffickers, but it also
disproportionately affects the African-American community.”182 Finally,
Representative Lundgren declared:
We initially came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio. By the time we
finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1. We didn’t really have an
evidentiary basis for it, but that’s what we did, thinking we were doing the
right thing at the time. Certainly, one of the sad ironies in this entire
episode is that a bill which was characterized by some as a response to the
crack epidemic in African American communities has led to racial

U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam); Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Ed., 512 F.2d 37, 50-51 (2d Cir.
1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1974).
176

Washington, 426 U.S. at 242.

177

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 35, at tbl.34.

178

Weikel, supra note 36; United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013).

179

United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2011).

180

155 CONG. REC. S10491 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009).

181

156 CONG. REC. S1682-83 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010).

182

156 CONG. REC. H6199 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).
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sentencing disparities which simply cannot be ignored in any reasoned
discussion of this issue.183
These members of Congress, along with the President, ushered the FSA into law.
As evidenced from the Congressional members quoted above, the FSA represented a
systematic shift to get rid of the discriminatory impact of the crack cocaine
sentencing scheme. Such intent from Congress, coupled with the statistics
demonstrating the discriminatory impact, is a powerful combination. While the FSA
meant to put such discriminatory impact behind us, those who remain in prison, and
fail to receive retroactive benefit of the FSA, are still victims of this discrimination.
For those inmates to remain in prison under these now-eroded discriminatory
sentences, perpetuates the discrimination. By maintaining such discrimination, and
failing to retroactively apply the FSA, the Equal Protection rights are being violated
for those who remain in prison under the pre-FSA sentences.184
Furthermore, to apply the FSA to defendants like Dorsey, whose crimes preceded
August 3, 2010, but not to those who were sentenced before August 3, 2010, is an
irrational and arbitrary place for courts to draw the line. Such an arbitrary and unjust
distinction also violates the Equal Protection Clause.185
B. Failure to Retroactively Apply the FSA Constitutes Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
Failure to retroactively apply the FSA also violates a defendant’s Eighth
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. A slew of Supreme Court
cases, from the 1950s through the present, have held a defendant’s sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment if it is
contrary to the “national consensus and evolving standards of decency.” The
statutory changes in the FSA, changes to the federal sentencing guidelines, as well as
state sentencing reforms regarding crack cocaine, represent a systematic and
widespread shift how crack cocaine offenders should be sentenced as compared to
powder cocaine offenders. Taken together, the reforms in sentencing represent an
evolution in the standards of decency. Thus, any defendant still subject to pre-FSA
penalties is serving a cruel and unusual punishment.
For generations, the Supreme Court has been guided by the “national consensus”
and “evolving standards of decency” in deciding whether a sentencing scheme
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. In Trop v. Dulles,186 the Supreme Court
declared a sentence unconstitutional because it offended our nation’s “standards of
decency.” In Trop, the petitioner was convicted by military court of desertion during
wartime and sentenced to loss of American citizenship.187 Trop filed for declaratory
183

156 CONG. REC. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).

184

Cf. Clarke v. City of Cincinnati, No. C-1-92-278, 1993 WL 761489 at *20 (S.D. Ohio
July 8, 1993), aff’d, 40 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 1994) (in a case finding the local electoral system
violated the Equal Protection Clause, held that even though the state action was not adopted
with a discriminatory intent, maintaining such a system was still unconstitutional).
185

Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1991); Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983).
186

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).

187

Id. at 88.
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judgment claiming to be a citizen.188 The Supreme Court held the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “forbids Congress to
punish by taking away citizenship,” and struck down Trop’s sentence.189 The Court
declared:
The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than
the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits
of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and even execution may be
imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any technique
outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect.190
“The Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. . . . This punishment is
offensive to the cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands.”191
The Court, looking to other nations, stated that denationalization is highly
disfavored.192 “The civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime . . . The United Nations’
survey of the nationality laws of eighty-four nations of the world reveals that only
two countries . . . impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion. In this country
the Eighth Amendment forbids that to be done.”193 Therefore, the Supreme Court set
a precedent of looking at “standards of decency” in evaluating whether a punishment
violates the Eighth Amendment.194
The next time the Supreme Court used such a standard was in Estelle v.
Gamble.195 In Estelle, a state prisoner filed a civil rights action against prison
officials for failure to provide medical care.196 The Supreme Court held deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and
punishment.197 The Court stated the Eighth Amendment prevents more than
physically barbarous punishments, but also “embodies broad and idealistic concepts
of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency. . . .”198 “Thus, we have held

188

Id.

189

Id. at 103.

190

Id. at 99-100 (citation omitted).

191

Id. at 101-02.

192

Id. at 102-03.

193

Id. at 102-03 (footnotes omitted).

194

See id.

195

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

196

Id. at 98.

197

Id. at 104.

198

Id. at 102 (citations omitted).
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repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”199
In 1988, the Supreme Court held Oklahoma's statute allowing execution of
children under age sixteen constituted cruel and unusual punishment.200 In Thompson
v. Oklahoma, the Court held executing children under age sixteen would “offend
civilized standards of decency.”201 The Court, in discussing its duty to re-evaluate
whether legislative decisions violate the standards of decency, stated:
There would be little need for judges—and certainly no office for a
philosophy of judging—if the boundaries of every constitutional
provision were self-evident. They are not. . . . The world changes in
which unchanging values find their application.
....
We must never hesitate to apply old values to new circumstances. . . . The
important thing, the ultimate consideration, is the constitutional freedom
that is given into our keeping. A judge who refuses to see new threats to
an established constitutional value, and hence provides a crabbed
interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair and reasonable meaning,
fails in his judicial duty.202
The Court held that standards of decency prevent execution of a child under age
sixteen, citing to the laws of a dozen other countries, the American Bar Association,
and the American Law Institute.203
In Atkins v. Virginia,204 the Supreme Court held imposition of the death penalty
for those suffering from mental retardation violated prevailing standards of decency.
In holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty for those suffering
from mental retardation, the Court held such a punishment is excessive, stating:
A claim that punishment is excessive is judged not by the standards that
prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the “Bloody Assizes”
or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that currently
prevail. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.205
In evaluating whether a sentence violates the standards of decency for a maturing
society, the Court looked at state’s recent legislative enactments on executing those
suffering from mental retardation.206 The Court stated in the preceding sixteen years
(from 1986 through 2002), nineteen different states passed legislation forbidding the
199
Id. at 103 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01;
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
200

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

201

Id. at 830.

202

Id. at 830 n.4.

203

Id. at 830-31.

204

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

205

Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).

206

Id. at 314.
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execution of those with mental retardation.207 Even in the states that had not passed
such legislation, the practice of executing those with mental retardation was
uncommon.208 The Court stated, “[i]t is not so much the number of these States that
is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change . . . provides powerful
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically
less culpable than the average criminal . . . and it is fair to say that a national
consensus has developed against it.”209 The Court declared in, “[c]onstruing and
applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our >evolving standards of decency,=
we . . . conclude that such punishment is excessive.”210
Three years after Atkins, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons,211 the
national consensus supported a categorical ban on imposing the death penalty for
individuals under 18 at the time of their crime. The Court stated:
The prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments,” like other
expansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to
its text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due
regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design. To
implement this framework we have established the propriety and affirmed
the necessity of referring to “the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society” to determine which punishments are
so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual.212
Following its methodology from Atkins, the Roper Court acknowledged there are
thirty states prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles, twelve of which have
abandoned the death penalty altogether, and eighteen expressly exclude juveniles.213
Furthermore, of the twenty states allowing execution of juveniles, only six states had
executed juveniles since 1989 and only three states since 1995.214 The Court also
noted that the United States is one of eight countries in the world to execute a
juvenile in the previous fifteen years.215 The Court concluded that an objective
consensus exists against the juvenile death penalty among the States, an infrequency
of its use even where it remains on the books, and consistency toward abolition of
the practice.216 Therefore, the Court held the execution of any juvenile violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.217
207

Id. at 314-15.

208

Id. at 316.

209

Id. at 315-16.

210

Id. at 321.

211

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

212

Id. at 560-61 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)).

213

Id. at 564.

214

Id. at 564-65.

215

Id. at 577.

216

Id. at 567.

217

Id. at 578.
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In 2008, the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment also prohibited the
death penalty for rape that did not result in the death of the victim. Kennedy v.
Louisiana.218 In forbidding imposition of the death penalty for a non-homicide crime
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court stated, whether this requirement has been
fulfilled is determined not by the standards that prevailed when the Eighth
Amendment was adopted in 1791 but by the norms that “currently prevail.”219 This is
because “[t]he standard of extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily
embodies a moral judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its
applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.”220
In Graham v. Florida,221 the Supreme Court held the prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment is violated by sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without
parole for a non-homicide crime. In Graham, a juvenile defendant, was convicted of
burglary and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.222 The
Supreme Court vacated his conviction and remanded the case based on Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.223 Justice Kennedy held, “to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”224
To determine the national consensus, the Court said it must begin with objective
indicia.225 “[T]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.”226 However, the Court
found legislation alone to be deficient on the issue, and chose to look at “actual
sentencing practices [for] the Court’s inquiry into consensus.”227 The Court found
sentences of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders, are
infrequent.228
The Court stated an inquiry on national consensus must also consider whether the
sentencing practice at issue serves legitimate penological goals.229 The Court went on
to say “[w]ith respect to life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders,
none of the goals of penal sanctions recognized as legitimate B retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation B provide an adequate justification.”230
218

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).

219

Id. at 419 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002)).

220

Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting)).

221

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).

222

Id. at 2018-19.

223

Id. at 2034.

224

Id. at 2021 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

225

Id. at 2022.

226
Id. at 2023 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
227

Id.

228

Id.

229

Id. at 2026 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437-38 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20).
230

Id. at 2028.
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Therefore, the Court struck down life without parole sentences for juveniles
convicted of a non-homicide crime, assuch a sentence violates the national
consensus and evolving standards of decency.
As indicated by the Supreme Court’s holdings, detailed above, a sentence can
violate the Eighth Amendment if it violates the national consensus or evolving
standards of decency. Our national consensus and standards of decency are not
stagnant, but are fluid and ever-changing concepts. To properly evaluate this
threshold, the constitutionality of a sentence must be considered through current
norms and values, not what our Founding Fathers may have done. To make such an
assessment, the Supreme Court has looked to: sentencing practices of other
countries231, legislative reforms by the states232, sentencing statistics233, and
sentencing practices throughout the country.234 The Supreme Court has not placed
any limits on what a court can consider in evaluating whether a sentence violates our
national consensus or evolving standards of decency. In following these standards,
failure to retroactively apply the FSA offends the national consensus and evolving
standards of decency and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment.
As detailed above, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 created the sentencing
disparity between crack and powder cocaine. For twenty years, this disparity
remained unchanged, but in 2007, the Sentencing Commission passed U.S.S.G.
Amendment 706, which lowered base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses.235
Soon after the passage of Amendment 706, the Supreme Court criticized the
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine in Spears v. United States.236
In Spears, the Supreme Court that held district courts have the authority to reject the
one hundred to one ratio altogether and replace it with a ratio the district court
believes to be more accurate.237 After the Court’s holding in Spears, a number of
federal courts rejected the crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing disparity and imposed
an equal (or one to one) ratio in sentencing crack offenders.238 Soon thereafter the

231
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,
830-31 (1988).
232

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15; Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65.

233

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.

234

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15.

235

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 706 (effective Nov. 1, 2007).

236

Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009).

237

Id. at 265.

238

See, e.g., United States v. Gully, 619 F. Supp. 2d 633 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (rejecting the
sentencing guideline range of 108 to 135 months and imposing a sentence of 84 months under
the 1:1 ratio); United States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2009) (imposing 130 month
sentence under 1:1 ratio); Sentencing Memorandum & Order at 3, United States v. Terry, No.
5:09-CR-0013 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2009) (Wells, J., imposing a sentence consistent with the
1:1 ratio of 18 months imprisonment); United States v. Griffin, No. 5:09-CR-008 (N.D. Ohio,
July 15, 2009) (Gwin, J., imposing a sentence consistent with the 1:1 ratio of 33 months; the
sentencing guideline was initially 70-87 months); United States v. Henderson, 660 F. Supp. 2d
751 (E.D. La. 2009); United States v. Golden, 679 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Iowa 2010); United
States v. Greer, 699 F. Supp. 2d 876 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
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FSA was passed by Congress and signed by the President; then the Sentencing
Commission further reduced the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines.239
Therefore, even though the disparity between crack and powder cocaine has
existed since the mid-1980s, significant erosion in the disparity between crack and
powder cocaine has occurred in the last six years. Such drastic changes, endorsed by
the Judiciary, Legislative, and Executive branches, represent a shift in the national
consensus as to the severity of the crack cocaine penalties as compared to powder
cocaine penalties.
On September 18, 2013, the United States Sentencing Commission unanimously
recommended to the Senate Judiciary Committee that the FSA be made
retroactive.240 The Sentencing Commission is a bi-partisan seven-member group of
federal judges who submit reports to Congress regarding the federal Sentencing
Guidelines.241 In this report, the Commission submitted a report to the Senate
Judiciary Committee on the impact of all mandatory minimums in federal
sentencing.242 Included in this report was a unanimous recommendation the FSA be
made retroactive.243 The Sentencing Commission detailed their previous efforts to
conform the Sentencing Guidelines to the FSA’s new mandatory minimums, by
passing U.S.S.G. Amendment 750.244 Commission also stated retroactive application
of the FSA was consistent with the guideline amendments, as both served to
“restor[e] fairness and reduc[e] disparities.”245 The Commission noted that
retroactive application of the FSA would result in reductions for 8,829 inmates, with
an average reduction of 53 months per inmate.246 Furthermore, of those potentiallyeligible, 87.7% are African-American.247
Even the states have criticized their own legislative disparities between crack and
powder cocaine. Ohio’s legislature has taken significant steps to reduce the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine sentences. On June 29, 2011, Ohio Governor
Kasich signed House Bill 86 into law, which completely eliminates Ohio’s
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine.248 On March 31, 2010, the
South Carolina Senate approved sweeping reforms to its drug laws, reducing
mandatory minimum sentences for first-time drug offenders, and eliminated
sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine possession.249 Connecticut,
239

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).

240

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 1.

241

Id.

242

Id.

243

Id. at 9-10.

244

Id. at 9; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AMENDMENT 750 (effective Nov. 1, 2011).

245

U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, STATEMENT OF JUDGE SARIS, supra note 34, at 9.

246

Id. at 10.

247

Id.

248

Amend. Sub. H.B. 86, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011).

249

Chris Haire, SC Senate Passes Sentencing Reform Bill that Would Decrease NonMar.
31,
2010,
Violent
Prison
Population,
CHARLESTON CITY PAPER,
http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/HaireoftheDog/archives/2010/03/31/sc-senate-passescrime-reform-bill-decreases-non-violent-prison-population.
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in 2005, passed Bill 6975, which ended the state’s disparity between crack and
powder cocaine.250 Connecticut’s sentencing laws now apply to crack and powder
cocaine equally; previously a conviction for selling half a gram of crack cocaine
resulted in the same five-year sentence as twenty-eight grams of powder cocaine.251
The state of Missouri had the largest crack to powder sentencing disparity among the
states; in 2012, the Missouri legislature significantly reduced the disparity.252 Iowa
previously had a one hundred to one crack to powder sentencing ratio, but in 2007
reduced the disparity to ten to one.253 In total, of the thirteen states which had a
sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine, nearly all had reduced this
disparity by 2007.254
These legislative changes reducing or eliminating the disparity between crack
and powder cocaine at both the state and federal levels represent comprehensive and
widespread change in the national consensus as to how our society views crack
cocaine sentences. The erosion of the disparity between crack and powder cocaine
represents that the punishments under 21 U.S.C. § 841 are now considered too harsh,
and new standards have emerged in society. Therefore, failure to retroactively apply
the FSA, and thereby maintaining the old discriminatory crack cocaine sentences,
now offends the national consensus and violates the Eighth Amendment.
VII. POLICY REASONS WHY THE FAIR SENTENCING ACT SHOULD BE RETROACTIVE
As an attorney with the Office of the Federal Defender, this Author advocates for
retroactivity of the FSA on behalf of his clients, as he currently represents clients
who will receive a significant sentence reduction if the FSA were retroactively
applied. He has multiple clients in the same position as Andre, mentioned earlier in
our article, serving mandatory sentences under the pre-FSA penalties—some are
even serving life sentences. As a citizen, not as an attorney representing his clients,
there are significant reasons why the FSA should be retroactive. Obviously, there are
arguments for equality, fairness, and a just result, but more tangibly, there are
financial incentives for retroactivity of the FSA. Retroactively applying the FSA will
literally save our country billions of dollars.
There are currently two hundred and eleven thousand people in Bureau of
Prisons facilities.255 For the fiscal year 2013 budget, the Department of Justice has
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requested that $8.6 billion go towards the Bureau of Prisons.256 About fifteen percent
of all federal prisoners—about thirty thousand people—are serving sentences for
crack cocaine offenses.257 About eighty-three percent of federal prisoners serving
crack cocaine sentences are African-American.258 Thousands of these prisoners are
incarcerated for life or for twenty, ten, or five years under mandatory minimum
crack cocaine sentences imposed prior to the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act.259
In fact, between January and August of 2010—before the passage of the FSA—
nearly four thousand defendants received mandatory minimum sentences for crack
cocaine.260 The cost of housing a healthy inmate in 2011 was $2,407.78 per month,
or $28,893.36 per year.261
Thus, our federal prisons continue to house, and ultimately pay for, thousands of
inmates who are serving sentences, which Congress has deemed to be unfair through
its enactment of the FSA. This is an exorbitant waste of our tax dollars. Retroactive
application of the FSA will ease this unnecessary fiscal strain.
To put things into perspective, let us look at the Northern District of Ohio. In the
Northern District of Ohio alone, there are currently about five hundred inmates
currently serving time in federal prison for pre-FSA crack cocaine offenses.262 Due
to the passage of the retroactive sentencing guideline amendment, U.S.S.G.
Amendment 750, the Office of the Federal Defender was appointed to represent all
five hundred inmates for potential sentence reduction motions, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2).263 In evaluating those potentially eligible, the Office of the Federal
Defender has investigated and detailed all the relevant information from each
defendant’s original sentencing hearing. As a result, the Office of the Federal
Defender for the Northern District of Ohio has filed one hundred and fifty-three
motions on behalf of those who are eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3582(c)(2).264 Of these, eighty-two motions have been granted and dozens are still
pending before either district courts or on appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.265 The granted motions have resulted in an aggregate reduction of two
thousand one hundred and ninety-five months of prison time.266 As the monthly cost
to incarcerate someone in the Bureau of Prisons is $2,407.78 (on average for a
healthy individual), these motions have saved the federal government approximately
$5.3 million in the Northern District of Ohio alone.
Many of these eighty-two defendants who have had motions granted were only
able to receive a reduction to the pre-FSA mandatory and were unable to receive
sentences below the mandatory minimum even though the FSA now exists.
Additionally, there remain approximately two hundred and fifty other inmates who
were unable to get any reduction as their sentence hinged on the pre-FSA mandatory
minimum sentence. The cost savings in retroactively applying the FSA to these
inmates is astounding. This author has gone through each and every of the five
hundred inmates serving crack cocaine sentences. For each one, this author has
calculated the new sentencing guidelines if the FSA’s statutory penalties were
retroactively applied to their sentences; all other aspects of their original sentencing
remain in place. Approximately three hundred of the defendants would be eligible
for some reduction. Assuming each defendant received a sentence at the low-end of
their new guideline range, the result would be an aggregate reduction of 15,915
months in prison, which averages out to about fifty-three months per eligible
inmate.267 This collective reduction equates to over $38 million in savings for the
Bureau of Prisons’ budget. These tremendous savings would be associated with
those three hundred inmates from the Northern District of Ohio alone. Given the fact
that there are ninety-three federal districts, the savings nationwide for this minor
change in the law would be billions of federal dollars.
Moreover, this retroactive application is not a hand-out or a technicality
conferred upon these inmates, it would merely be applying the current law to their
sentences. Consistent with the FSA, such an initiative would be fair, not just to those
serving prison sentences, but also fair to the American taxpayer. There is no reason
why tax dollars should go to continue to incarcerate inmates serving unnecessarily
long sentences, which Congress has determined to be unfair and discriminatory.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 was a significant event for all
defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses. The Act itself, as well as the
litigation that has followed, has given rise to an opportunity for these defendants to
seek relief. For both the precedent and policy reasons detailed above, the FSA should
be made retroactive. Doing so will allow defendants like Andre to receive a fair and
just sentence, which was the reason the FSA was passed in the first place.
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